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several enactments now and heretofore in fact 
reference in section 27 4c the Code of 
Procedure are read in connection with section 869 of 
the Penal Code, it appears that in an classes of criminal cases 
eogllizable in the municipal courts, and iu a 1l civil cases 
in whieh the n:porters are under to 
the compensation therefor bas been 
aetion of t1Je Legislature and the scheme has 
fr,,m the outset contemplated that their compensation should 
entirely of and in no part of salaries. [20] Ac-
we eonelude that the provisions for salarie1; of 
r•onrt reporters in San Diego are inapplicable to 
mlirlieipal eomt reporters in that eounty, and that there :is 
nn legal basis for the sa 1ar:- claim embraced in the cross-
l'l'mplaint of Milotz. 
The judgment in favor of plaintiff on its complaint is 
ren~rt>ed, bnt the judgment in favor of plaintiff and against 
llefenclant Milot7. on the latter's eross-cornp]aint is affirmed; 
tlw parties to bear their ovm costs on these appeals. 
\;ibson, C .• T., Shenk, J., Carter, 
:\!,;Comb, .J., concurred. 
[Sa e. 0: o, 647:2. ln Bank. .] unc 
Schauer, .L, and 
1 f)[)(). J 
\Y ILLIAJ\I l<'lSCH.J1jH, H(·~polHlent, v. COU.'JTY OF 
SHAS'l'A et al., Appellant::;. 
[11 Highways-Maintenance-Lighting.-·A county, through it~ 
hoard o[ supeni:;or~, may use the special road maintenanet> 
di~triet procedure provid!~rl in Sts. & Hy. CodP, ~ 1550.1, for 
npernting nnd maintaining a :<treet lighting ~ystem which em 
brac:Ps a state highway as well as county highwnys and strec:1ts 
i11 nnin<'orporate([ COlllllllmities within tho county. 
Id.-Definitions.-The word "road" as used in Sts. & Hy. Codr, 
§ 1550.1, relating to road maintenance districts, ineludes a 
state highway. 
Statut.es-Construction-_:Presumptions.- It is tlw t 
thP LPgislature k!li'W tho meaning of the language used in a 
! 1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Highway,; and Streets, § 66 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: 4, 6, 7] Highways, § 77; [2] High-
\\;Jys, §1; [3] Statutes, §185; [5] Highways, §73. 
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statute and used it advisedly, such as that in the tel'lll 
"roads" in Sts. & Hy. Code, § 1550.1, and the term "county 
highways" in §§ 1553, 1554, the Legislature intended that each 
term should be given a different meaning. 
[ 4] Highways- Maintenance- Lighting.- The maintenance of 
street lights on state highways does not lie exclusively 
the jurisdiction of the Department of Public Works, since 
a maintenance district and certain local districts mav 
maintain street lighting on state highways. ' 
[5] !d.-Maintenance-Statutory Provisions.-The of 
Sts. & Hy. Code, § 1550.1, relating to road maintenance dis-
trictB, does not necessarily limit the use of diRtrict funds 
to roads that arc otherwise eligible for county road moneys, 
the use of the word "additional" not being a limitation on the 
use of the fund but rather a general description of it. 
[6] Id.-Maintenance-Lighting.-Sts. & Hy. Code, § 19002, ex-
pressly provides that the Highway Lighting District Act is 
merely an alternative procedure for providing street lights, 
and hence the board of supervisors has a choice of proceeding 
either under that section or under § 1550.1, relating to road 
maintenance districts. 
[7] Id.-Maintenance-Lighting.-A special road maintenance dis-
trict has no duty to maintain signs, signals or street lights for 
the benefit of motorists, but it has the power to maintain 
street lights on a state highway for local benefit if it first 
obtains a permit from the Department of Public Works. 
APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of 
Shasta County. Albert F. Ross, Judge. ReYersed. 
Action to enjoin county and its board of supervisors from 
maintaining street lighting in a county road maintenance dis-
trict and to have declared illegal a contract between defendant 
eounty and defendant electric company for furnishing lights 
in ePrtain unincorporated communities of county. Judgment 
for plaintiff reversed. 
I1aurence J. Kennedy, ,Jr., and Randall J. Presleigh, Dis-
trict Attorneys (Shasta), Robert H. Gerdes, WilliamS. Love 
and Chenoweth & Leininger for Appellants. 
Robert E. Reed and \Varren P. Marsden, Counsel, Depart-
ment of Public Works, State of California, and \Villiam M. 
Siegel as Amici Curiae on behalf of Appellants. 
Daniel S. Carlton, Carlton & Shadwell and Robert A. 
Haughwout for Ile;;pondent. 
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board 
in Shasta 
found in favor of plaintiff and granted 
for. I<'rom this judgnwnt defendants appeal. 
discloses the following facts: Three eommu-
the town of Central Valley, Project City 
Pine Grove is a subdivision adjacent to 
Number 99, while Project City is at the junction 
uf High·way Number 99 and Highway Number 209, which 
highway extends to Shasta Dam. Central Y alley con-
s! a town on and adjacent to Highway Number 209 and 
i~ between Highway Number 99 and Shasta Dam but a short 
distance from Project City. 
Because of the necessity of lighting these communities along 
two state highways and the county highways leading 
street lights were installed by the Pacific Gas and 
Ekctric Company, hereinafter referred to as the "power 
eompany, '' and were maintained by voluntary contributions 
foe considerable period before the creation of the mainte-
J iH!We district. 
voluntary financing was unsatisfactory and it was 
deemed necessary to continue the street and highway lighting 
or the above-mentioned communities. 'l'herefore, defendant 
board of supnrvisors established the Shasta County Hoad 
J\Iai.Htenance District Number 1 under the provisions of section 
1 of the Streets and Highways Code.* 
-~section 1550.1 of the Streets and Highways Code reads as follows: 
'' board of supervisors may form special road maintenance districts 
in subdivided areas of the county wholly outside of incorporated cities. 
fz,emation of said districts may be OTdered by the board of supervisors 
in their opiPion ndditional road funds are necessary to properly 
maintain roads in specific areas of the county. Such districts shall be 
formed by order of the board setting fmth the boundaries thereof, and 
in no case shall a special road maintenance district be formed where the 
boundaries of said district cause it to include lands within more than 
county road district as formed under Seetion 1020 of this Streets 
Highways Code. Such district shall be in existence until the board 
by its order discontinue such district. If such a district is to be 
formed, the board of supervisors shall set a date for a hearing on said 
formation. Such hearing shall not be held in less than three weeks after 
date of the order for the hearing, and prior to the date of the 
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After the district was formed, the board of 
on entered into a contract with 
the power company to 32 lights in the to be 
for by the county of Shasta. The property owners 
the district provided the maintenance fund by special taxes. 
Approximately 19 of the 32 lamps here involved are located 
or upon the two state highways. The remainder are 
on the streets or connecting county highways near the inter. 
sections thereof with the state highways. These 19 
were installed under written encroachment permit consents of 
the Division of Highways. 
The questions presented for determination are: 
[1] First: Can a county, through its board of supervisors, 
use the special road maintenance district procedure provided 
in section 1550.1 of the Streets and Highways Code for 
operating and maintaining a lighting system which embraces 
a state highway as well as cmmty highways and streets in 
unincorporated communities within the county? 
'l'his question must be answered in the affirmative. The 
board of supervisors of a county may form a special road 
maintenance district in subdivided areas of the county wholly 
outside of incorporated cities. (Sts. & Hy. Code, §§ 1550.1, 
1550.2, 1550.3) The lighting of streets is included within 
the word ''maintenance'' as used in section 1550.1 of the 
Streets and Highways Code. Section 27 of the code reads 
in part as follows : ''As used in the general provisions and 
in Divisions I and II of this code, 'maintenance' includes: 
. . . (e) Such illumination of streets, roads, highways and 
bridges which in the judgment of the body authorized to 
expend such funds is required for the safety of persons 
using the said streets, roads, highways and bridges.'' 
[2] Plaintiff urges, however, that the word "road" used 
in section 1550.1 of the Streets and Highways Code does not 
include a "state highway." This contention is contrary to 
the definition of the word as found in numerous authorities. 
'rhe word "road" is a generic term which includes highways, 
streets, public ways and thoroughfares. 
hearing, a notice of said hearing shall be published twice in a news-
paper of general circulation in the area, and, in addition, at least three 
notices shall be posted in public places within the proposed district. .At 
the hearing, protests may be heard on the proposed formation of such 
district. It shall be within the power of the board of supervisors to 
determine from the results of the hearing the necessity for said special 
road maintenance district, and, if it be deemed necessary, the district 
may be formed as hereinbefore provided.'' 
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Webster New lnteruational ed. 1937), 
2155, defines the word "road" as: "A where 
may ride; an open \Yay or public passage for vehicles, 
and animals; . . . Road is generally applied to a 
outside of an urban district, as distinct from a 
which is a highway in an urban district." 
Black's Law Dictionary (4th eel. 1951), page 1491, reads: 
·'Hoad. A '' 
,T uris SccmHlnm ( 1944), volume High ways, 
915, reads: '' 'l'he term I highway J has been held synon-
~·mons with 'public road' and 'street.' " 
In B. & lf. Transportation Go. v. Johnson, 122 Cal.App. 451 
453 [10 P.2d flOG], the court said: "Roads and highways 
generic terms embracing all kinds of public ways, such 
as county and township roads, streets, etc.'' 
In San Franc1:sco-Oaklancl Terminal Rys. v. County of Ala-
66 Cal.App. 77 at 81 [225 P. 304] (hearing denied by 
the Supreme Court), the court said : ''A public way over 
unincorporated territory of a county is generally referred 
to as a highway or road.'' 
In People v. Oclom, 19 Cal.App.2d 641 at G50 [8] P.2d 
, the court, quoting with approval from the Vehicle 
said : '' 'Street' or 'highway' is a way or place of 
whatever nature open to the use of the public as a matter 
right for purposes of vehicular travel.'' 
To the same effect are: Johnston v. Wortham Machinery 
60 Wyo. 301 [151 P.2d 89 at 91 [2]] ; Steelman v. Inhabi-
tants of Southbridge, 34 Mass. 162 at 165; Barber Asphalt 
l'aving Go. v. Headley Good Roads Go., 283 F. 236 at 237 
; Herbert v. City of Richland Genter, 264 Wis. 8 [58 
.W.2d 461 at 462 [1, 2]] ; Inhabitants of Windham v. Cum-
INrland Connty Comrs., 26 Me. 406, 409; Strange v. Board 
Gomrs. of Grant County, 173 Ind. 640 [91 N.E. 242 ai 
; Shannon v. Martin, 164 Ga. 872 [139 S.E. 671 at 672, 54 
A.L.R. 1246]; Washington County, Neb. v. Williams, 111 F. 
801 at 808 [49 C.C.A. 621]; People Y. Con1rniss1:oners of But-
County, 4 ::-.Jeb. 150 at 158. 
ln Yiew of the foregoing, the conclusion is inc::;capable that 
1 he word "t·oa< l" as nsed in :-;ection ] G50.1 of the Streets 
and Highways (!ode 8lrould be givl'll its ordinary meaning 
iudude all higlmay:-;, <·owt1y or statt•. [3] It is presumed 
that t lw I J<'gislature lmew the uwani11g of the language used 
the statute and used it advisedly. (Anderson v. I. M. 
Jameson Corp., 7 Cal.2d 60 at 67 [59 P.2d 962].) Therefore, 
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when the used the term "roads" in section 1550.1 
and used the term ''county '' in sections 1553 and 
1554, which sections are contained in chapter 7, division 2, 
of the Streets and Highways Code, the presumption is that 
the Legislature used these terms advisedly and intended that 
each term should be given a different meaning. The pre-
sumption is not, as plaintiff contends, that when the 
ture used the term "roads" it meant roads 
If the Legislature had intended to limit the application of 
section 1550.1 to "county roads" it would have so stated 
and not used the word ''road,'' which includes every character 
of highway, including a state highway. 
[4] Second: Does the maintenance of stTeet lights on state 
highways lie exclusively within the jurisdiction of the De-
partment of Public Works? 
This question must be answered in the negative. Plaintiff 
apparently has abandoned this contention, which appears in 
his complaint, for in his reply memo submitted to the trial 
court he concedes that a highway lighting district formed 
by the board of supervisors under part 4, division 14, of the 
Streets and Highways Code may maintain street lights on a 
state highway. On page 1, lines 24-30, he says: "We wish 
to call to the Court's attention the fact that the Board of 
Supervisors could unquestionably and beyond dispute have 
contracted with defendant Pacific Gas & Electric Co. for 
lighting State Highways 209 and 99 within the Central Valley 
and Project City areas, if they so wished, by specifically 
creating a highway lighting district in accordance with 
the provisions of the Highway Lighting District Act." 
Having conceded that a maintenance district may maintain 
street lighting and that certain local taxing districts may 
maintain street lighting on state highways, plaintiff is left 
with the argument that the wrong local taxing district has 
been employed-that this particular taxing district may main-
tain street lights on county highways but not on state high-
ways. This argument is predicated npon reading something 
into the statute that is not expressed and that was not 
intended, that is, construing the term ''roads'' as though 
it read" county highways." 
[5] It does not appear that 1he Janguag·e of seetion H550.1 
of the Streets and Highways Code necessarily I imits the use 
of district funtls to roads that are otherwise eligible for 
eounty road moneys. 
The use of the word "additional" is not a limitation upon 
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JJe:k!ll:IJtau.u:tJ meant the funds to be 
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C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and 
concurred. 
J.-1 dissent. 
here has, without any discussion of the com-
statutory scheme set up by the Legislature in 
C!+·~,.,,.., and Highways Code, decided that this case must 
There in the majority opinion, no discussion 
the numerous detailed provisions set forth in the Streets 
each of which has a specific bearing on 
intended for each type of public way. 
has, instead, relied on various dictionary defi-
nitions of the word "road," on several California cases which 
not and on numerous out-of-state cases without 
any the statutory provisions there involved. If 
had no Streets and Highways Code and if it were 
up to this court to decide whether or not the word "road" 
be construed to include "state highway," then, and 
, would the majority opinion have any How-
l<'IscHEl~ v. CouNTY SHASTA 
California has a Streets and Highways Code which sets 
forth in minute detail every conceivable factor any 
"'"''"'"u"' on any type of public way. 
Inasmuch as the majority opinion leaves much to be desired 
in setting forth the legislative scheme for the acquisition, 
control, and maintenance of public ways, I consider it my 
to present, at some length, the reason why the majority 
is in error in its conclusion that the word "road" includes 
''a state highway.'' 
The factual situation set forth in the majority opinion is 
correct. The Board of Supervisors of Shasta County, acting 
pursuant to section 1550.1 of the Streets and Highways Code, 
formed a maintenance district to light certain parts of two 
state highways. After the formation of the maintenance dis-
trict, the board of supervisors entered into a contract with 
the Pacific Gas and Electric Company to furnish lights on 
these highways which were located in certain unincorporated 
areas of Shasta County. Plaintiff objected on the ground that 
the county improperly proceeded under section 1550.1 of the 
Streets and Highways Code and that the contract entered 
into pursuant thereto was illegal and void and should be set 
aside. ·with these contentions of the plaintiff, I agree for 
the following reasons : 
Section 1550.1 of the Streets and Highways Code provides 
that" The board of supervisors may form special road mainte-
nance districts, in subdivided areas of the county wholly 
outside of incorporated cities. Formation of said districts 
may be ordered by the board of supervisors when in their 
opinion additional road funds are necessary to properly main-
tain roads in specific areas of the county." (Emphasis added.) 
The question here presented is one of first impression and 
may be stated quite simply: Whether the word ''roads'' in 
the above quoted section includes state highways. 
Plaintiff contends that state highways are not included 
within the word ''roads'' and that section 19030 of the Streets 
and Highways Code provides the only method by which such 
state highways may be lighted other than where the state 
itself undertakes the maintenance of such lighting facilities. 
Section 19030 provides that ''Any unincorporated town or 
village of this State may establish a highway lighting district 
for the purpose of installing and maintaining a street lighting 
system on public highways, for the better protection of its 
residents in accordance with the provisions of this part.'' It 
is conceded by defendants that this section and those following 
1 Frscnrm v. CoLTN'rY m' SHAS'rA 
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of 
within unincorporated areas, but defendants 
word "roads" includes, by implication, state 
and that section 27 defines "maintenance" as 
the illumination of such "streets, roads, high,yays 
which in the judgment the body anthorized to 
snch for the safety pe1·sons 
highways and bridges." (Emphasi" 
Plaintiff maintains that the italicized portion of 
section set forth proves his point: That section 24 
,[dines ''State high·way'' as meaning any highway acquired, 
id constructed, improved or maintained as a state 
pursuant to constitutional or legislative authoriza-
; that section 90 provides that the State Department of 
Public \Vorks "shall have full possession and control of all 
highways ... ''; that section 91 provides that the 
Department of Public ·works "shall improve and maintain 
state highways ... "; and that this court said in 
v. City of Los Angeles, 36 Cal.2d 553, 559 [225 
.2d 5221, that "The State Department of Public Works has 
'full possession and control' of all state highways''; that, as 
result, the procedure specifically outlined by sections 19000 
through 19312, Division 14, Part 4, Chapters 1 through 17, 
the only way in which unincorporated areas may light 
state highways. These sections, relied upon by plaintiff, re-
nire a petition, an election, and a resolution by the board 
supervisors before a street lighting district may be formed 
distinguished from the procedure set forth in section 1550.1 
which \vas followed by defendants. 
Plaintiff's argument is, in brief, that only the State Depart-
went of Public \Vorks as "the authorities charged with the 
maintenance thereof" (concluding paragraph of section 27) 
has the authority to maintain state highways unless the 
Streets and Highways Code otherwise provides and that, in 
ibis instance, there is an express alternative method provided 
in section 19000 et seq. These sections, as heretofore 
provide for a petition, an election, and a resolution by 
1 }Je board of supervisors before a street lighting district may 
fornwd. Plaintiff correctly contends that when a statute 
~cts forth a certain procedure to be followed, that procedure 
exelnsive and mandatory (Gleason v. Sprau, 81 Cal. 217 
P. 551, 15 Am.St.Rep. 47] ; Blalock v. Ridgway, 92 Ca1. 
App. 132 [267 P. 713]; Miller v. }fcKinnon, 20 Cal.2d 83 [124 
P.2d 34, 140 A.L.R. 570]; Connly of San Diego v. California 
780 F'rscnER v. CouNTY oF SHAS'l'A 
Water etc. Co., 30 Cal.2d 817, 823, 826 
A.L.R. 747]). 
It is obvious that the Streets and 
a comprehensive plan for the construction, 
ation and control of public roads and vvays. This code 
first enacted in 1935 (Stats. 1935, ch. 29). It was 
to be an act to establish a streets and 
consolidating and revising the law 
and all the appurtenances thereto. 
contain general provisions, definitions and other 
code next contains Division 1 which relates to state 
' Division 2 relates to county highways; Division 2.5 relates 
to city streets. Each division carefully sPts forth 
governing the construction, maintenance, control and posses-
sion of the different types of public ways and to the 
several public agencies jurisdiction over the different classi-
fications. 
Under "General Provisions," "Highway" is defined in 
section 23; "Freeway" is defined in section 23.5; "State 
Highway" is defined in section 24; "County ' is 
defined in section 25. The word ''shall'' is expressly made 
mandatory and the word "may" is expressly made permissive. 
Section 90 provides that the ''department [of public 
shall have fttU possession and control of all state highways 
and all property and rights in property for state 
highway purposes. . . . '' Section 91 provides that ''The de-
partment shall improve and maintain the state highways, 
including all traversable highways which have been adopted 
or designated as state highways by the commission, as pro-
vided in this code." Section 27 (e) provides that "mainte-
nance" includes "Such illumination of high-
ways and bridges which in the judgment author-
ized to expend s1wh funds is required for the 
using the said streets, roads, highways and bridges. 
Almost all of Division 1 is devoted to state l~aeh 
state highway is given a route number and each route i~ 
specifically described in a separate section. For 
section 309 provides "Route 9. Route 9 is from: 
near Montalvo to Houte 4 near San Fernando. San J<'er-
nando to San Bernardino.'' One entire artiele of division 
1 sets forth the procedure to be followed fot' aid for 
state highways; another article deals with cooperative con-
struction by the counties with the state, of state highways. 
Still another article deals with cooperation between the 
l''rc;c!IEH v. CouNTY m· SnAc;TA 
L46 C.2cl 771; 299 P.2cl 2221 
781 
Bven t h<' most I'll rsor_v exami· 
('oil•· ]PBds tn tlw •·on 
inient WilS to provide for ever)· 
<Wt·ur and that, in ilw pt·o,·ess of so 
was (•xt remely explicit.. 
of the Streets and Highways Code deals with 
" and "grade districts" and "Yacation of 
str,•et;:;.'' ln this division, section 8116 is of interest 
enumerates the types of public way which may be 
the board of a county as county roads or 
or s!nte highways, or city streets. If the word 
'' included all of these, why should the I..~egislature have 
time and effort in enumerating them~ Section 8145 
itemizes the different types of public way as "city streets, 
roads or highways, state highways." It seems very 
~nq~,,~.,. that the Legislature considered a road as something 
different from a county highway or a state highway 
street and that it went to great lengths to he 
in each division of the Streets and Highways Code. 
10 deals with the Improvement Bond Act of 1915 
in section 8570 we find the same specific enumeration of 
different types of public ways. A further illustration 
the exaetitude with which the Legislature set forth its 
m~er-all plan for all public ways is found in Division 1 which 
is entitled "Department of Public \Vorks." Section 145 
that ''The State Engineer is authorized to lay out 
construct local service roads on and along any State 
'' 'l'his illustration is hut one of many which 
be given to prove that when tbe Legislature meant 
''road'' it said ''road'' and when it meant '' higlnvay'' it said 
without equiYocation and without leaving what it meant 
Under division 3, chapter 3, entitled ''High-
Fund" we find that the moneys payable to the 
must be apportioned in eertain definite ways. :B..,or 
seetion 2114 provides that "there shall be paid to 
eligible thereto an amount eomputed monthly as 
The number of miles of maintained eounty ~·oad 
shall he multiplied by twmty-five dollars 
Part 1 of division 16 is entitled "Highway Districts." Not 
srction uses the word "road" or "roads." Th<• 
words used are ''highways'' and ''public highways.'' 
2 of division 16 is entitled "Boulevard Districts." Sec-
26114 reads as follows: "For the purposes of this 
thr dis1riet may take ovrr, control, operate, and use 
or ln any 
construct any boulevard in whole or in 
or upon all or any of any road public high-
, If the lJegislaturc had intended the word "road" 
to include "State higlnvay," ·why should it have entitled the 
above section "Use of road or public highway~" 
Part of division 16 is entitled "Bridge and Highway 
Districts" and again, the word "road" is not used in any 
of the sections in the division. Division 17 is entitled "Toll 
'l'oll Ferries and 'l'oll Roads.'' Chapter 2 of this 
division deals with toll highways; 3 deals specifically 
with toll roads. 
Division 14, part 1, is entitled ''Street I~ighting Act of 
1919" and refers to the lighting of streets within a ; part 
2 is the "Street Lighting Act of 1931" and also deals with 
the lighting of streets within a city; part 3 is the "JJ:Innieipal 
l.Jighting Maintenance District Act of 1927" and deals with 
the lighting of streets within cities and municipalities. Part 
4 is the "Highway Lighting Dist1·ict Aet" and refers to the 
lighting of ( § 19008) "any highway, county highway, State 
highway, public streets, avenue, alley, park, parkway, drive-
way, or public place, in any county, or unincorporated town 
or village.'' Again, the Legislature has been specific and has 
enumerated the various types of public ways which might 
need lighting, and set forth in succeeding sections the precise 
method by which it might be accomplished. 
Division 14 is entitled ''The Highway Lighting District 
Act'' and specifically notes that it provides for an '' alterna-
tive" method for making the improvements authorized "by 
this part'' ( § 19002). This division sets forth the procedure 
whereby unincorporated areas may light state highways 
( §§ 19008 and 19030) when the state, as the body authorized 
to make such improvements ( § § 90 and 91) has not seen fit 
to do so. Section 19008 defines "Public highway" as includ-
ing any highway, county highway, or "State highway," 
thereby leaving nothing to implication. The balance of the 
sections in the division contains an exact and comprehensive 
plan for accomplishing what the division permits-the forma-
tion of a highway lighting district by 1tnincorporaled areas 
to light state highwnys. It is elementary that when the Leg-
islature has spoken so clearly this court should not, by impli-
cation, read "state highways" into the word "roads" in 
order to approve the action taken here by the Board of 
Supervisors of Shasta County in acting pursuant to section 
.F'rscmm v. Coux'l.'Y OJ'' SHASTA 
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Code which doE's not 
that as authority for the 
eonelusion that the word "road" includes a 
," the majority cites ·webster's New Inter-
' Black's Law Dietionary, Corpus ,Juris 
Johnstr;n v. W oriham 
from a ease, 8tedrnan v. Inhab1:tants 
a Massachusetts case, as well as a ease from 
and one from Nebraska, and from \Vis-
are not informed whether these various states 
'rho majority quotes from B. &: II. 1'ransp. Co. v. Johnson. 
Cal.App. 451, 453 [10 P.2d 506], that "Roads and high-
v·ays are generic terms embracing all kinds of publie ways, 
such as county and township roads, streets, ete. '' This case 
involved a construction of section 15 of article XIII of the 
state Constitution which provided for taxation of public per-
or property transportation for compensation "over any 
highway in this state between fixed termini or over a 
n·gular route .... " The court relying upon section 2618 
the Political Coc1e defined public highways as follows: 
''In all counties of this state public highways are roads, 
alleys, lanes, courts, places, trails, and bridges ... '' 
•·ume to the conclusion ;just set forth. It is very interesting 
to note that section 2618 of the Political Code is now section 
of the Streets and Highways Code which reads as follows: 
"County Highway. As used in this code, 'county highway' 
means any highway which is: (a) Laid out or constructerl 
such by the county. (b) Laid out or constructed by other,; 
nnd dedicaterl or abandoned to or acquired by the eonnty. 
( ) Made a county highway in any action for the partitioll 
real property. (d) Made a county highway pursuant to 
" It is very obvious, therefore, that thiR ease has no 
b''aring whatsoever upon a present construction of the Rtreets 
and Highways Code. Also cited as authority for the proposi-
l ion that ''road'' includes ''highway'' is San Francisco-Oak-
!rmd 1'cnn£nal Rys. v. County of Alameda, 66 Cal.App. 77, 
[225 P. 304]. This ease involved a construction of lan-
';nage userl in cet·tain franchises granted to a railroad corpo-
nttion unineorporated i erritory in Alameda County 
\\·hich was annexed to and became a part of the city of 
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Oakland. The language quoted in the 
''A public way over unincorporated 
generally referred to as a highway or road'' was taken 
the following paragraph: "The case is presented on the 
that the franchises covered the right to street-car 
lines 'over certain streets within unincorporated +m"";c"''" 
the County of Alameda.' Strictly speaking, word 'street' 
relates to a public way within a municipality A 
way over unincorporated territory of a 
referred to as a highway or road. From the 
appears that in the franchises the words 'public 
ways,' and 'routes' are used. A public road or 
through unincorporated territory is generally a 
dedicated to the public use but not owned as such 
county. Generally speaking, the same applies to a public 
street within a municipality. The exceptions in both instances 
are where highways or streets are obtained in fee by the 
county or the city through public or private grant. In most 
cases the fee to the land rests in the adjoining property 
owner and the public holds an easement for the use. Where 
an easement only is acquired, the right lies in the people of 
the state and the county or the city is merely the agent or 
trustee of the state committed to the duty of maintaining 
the highway for the use of the public. In the absence of any 
showing to the contrary, we may assume, in support of the 
judgment, that these franchises covered the to use 
public highways in which the county did not O"\Yn the 
but which were dedicated to public use in the ordinary and 
usual way. 
''Thus, in so far as it concerns the public highways over 
which the franchises were granted, the county had no property 
to lose and these highways became public streets of the 
of Oakland upon the annexation of the territory where they 
were located, at least when so declared to be by the city 
authorities. In any event, the entire jurisdiction and control 
over such highways for the benefit of the state was thenceforth 
imposed in the city and all jurisdiction of the county in 
respect thereto ceased with the annexation.'' The court con-
cluded that when the franchises were grant ell ''the 
was merely acting as the agl'Ut of the state .. that whell 
the supervision and dmtrol of these highways \Ya~; tramd'<•rred 
io a new siate ageney, it carried the benefittS as well as ihe 
burdens, ineluding the right to collect and retain these 
charges." (Emphasis that of the court.) It is that 
1 1<-,I~cnErt 'V. Cou;-.;TY OF SHAS'I'A 
[46 C.2d 771; 299 P.2d 222] 
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ease does not stand for the proposition that the word 
" ineludes "higlrways." v. Odorn, 19 CaL 
650 P.2d 206], involved section 480 of the 
In this case the defendant was charged with 
a motor vehicle upon a public highway and 
to stop to render aid to an person as 
subdivision of the V chicle Code. rrhe 
''There is no merit to the contention 
is a fatal variance between the allegation of the 
information that the accident occurred 'upon a public high-
, in l\Ierced County and the proof that the body of the 
>ras found on 'Shaffer Road.' . . . It is immaterial 
whether the accident occurred on a street in Atwater or on 
extension of that street outside of the city limits, termed 
Shaffer Hoad. It was called both a highway and a street. 
Section 81 of the Vehidc Coclc c1dhws a highway as follows: 
' "Street" or "highway" is a way or place of whatever 
nature open to the use of the public as a matter of right 
purposes of vehicular travel.' 
''There can be no doubt the accident occurred on a roadway 
open to the public for the purposes of vehicular travel. '!'here 
appears to be no variance in that regard." 
From this summary of the three California cases used by 
the majority to prove the point that "road" includes "high-
, it can at once be seen ·without any stretching of the 
imagination that none of them has the slightest bearing upon 
construction of the Streets and Highways Code. 
I would affirm the judgment. 
---
